Utilising a wide range of archival correspondence and diaries, this monograph reconstructs the 1974-79 Labour government's policies in Northern Ireland. It covers the collapse of power-sharing in May 1974, the secret dialogue with the Provisional IRA during the 1975 ceasefire, the acquiescence of Labour ministers in continuing indefinite direct rule from Westminster, efforts to mitigate conflict through industrial investment, a major shift in security policy emphasizing the police over the army, the adaptation of republicans to the threat of these new measures and their own adoption of a 'Long War' strategy. In so doing, it sheds light on the challenges faced by British ministers, civil servants, soldiers and policemen and the reasons why the conflict lasted so long. It will be a key text for researchers and students of both British and Northern Irish politics.
Introduction
1. Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland 1964-74
2. The collapse of power-sharing
3. Drift?
4. Negotiating the Provisional IRA ceasefire
5. Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire
6. After the ceasefire
7. Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation
8. 'Positive direct rule': economic policy
9. Political inertia
10. The evolution of the long war
Conclusion
Index
